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The so-called ‘Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument’, as characterized e.g. by Mark 
Colyvan (2001), is an argument for mathematical Platonism, the claim that at least some 
of our mathematical theories (specifically, those that are indispensable to empirical science) 
are true of a realm of abstract mathematical objects. But Hilary Putnam (2012) complains 
that his indispensability argument was never intended as an argument for Platonism, but 
only for a non-ontological form of mathematical realism, where what is defended is math-
ematical objectivity, but not the existence of mathematical objects.
Precisely what does Putnam’s mathematical ‘realism without ontology’ amount to, and 
is Putnam’s right that his indispensability considerations establish his realism without es-
tablishing Platonism?
Putnam (2012) suggests that the reason for resisting Platonism despite the indispensa-
ble presence of mathematics in empirical science is that the apparently ontologically com-
mitting mathematical claims used can be replaced by modal-structural translations (in 
the manner of Hellman (1989), which develops the proposal of Putnam (1967)). On the 
‘mathematics as modal logic’ picture, the mathematical claims used in science are objec-
tively true, but their truth doesn’t require the existence of mathematical objects, Platonisti-
cally construed, but only the objectivity of their modal translations.
In the contemporary debate between Platonism and anti-Platonism, then, while most 
take it that acceptance of the indispensability of mathematics supports Platonism, Putnam 
falls squarely on the anti-Platonist side. But Putnam (2012) is highly critical of contempo-
rary fictionalism as an anti-Platonist account of mathematics. Putnam argues that Field’s 
dispensabilist fictionalism, if it could be made to work, would adequately respond to 
Putnam’s indispensability argument, but that alternative instrumentalist versions of fiction-
alism (such as is offered by Rosen 2001) would fail as a response. Putnam’s concerns about 
instrumentalist fictionalism include the complaint that, in order to resist the indispensa-
bility argument fictionalists presuppose an abstract/concrete divide, but they cannot char-
acterize what they take to be the truths about ‘the concrete world’ except by reference to 
mathematics, and the complaint that, in refusing to believe that the explanations offered by 
our ordinary scientific theories are true, holding instead that they are nominalistically ade-
quate, fictionalists abandon the scientific project of explanation.
As Concha Martinez Vidal’s discussion makes clear, Putnam’s objections to con-
temporary instrumentalist fictionalism are rather puzzling. In particular, she argues, both 
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Field’s dispensabilist fictionalism, and Putnam’s modal structural realism, also require that 
we can make sense some kind of brute notion of ‘concreteness’. For Field’s fictionalism, in 
order to make sure that his nominalistically-stated theories (expressed in a nominalistic vo-
cabulary) don’t place restrictions on the abstract realm (and thereby contradict conserva-
tiveness), he has to relativize their universally quantified claims to all non-mathematical 
things. And to the extent that Putnam’s ‘objectivity without objects’ view depends on the 
success of Hellman’s modal structural interpretation of applied mathematics, this account 
also needs some way of pinning down the actual concrete world to modalize on (via a ‘non-
interference proviso’). It would seem that Putnam’s modal structural account can avoid on-
tological realism if and only if instrumental fictionalism can.
But can either account really avoid commitment to mathematical objects? One con-
cern in the attempt to avoid ontology by showing that existence claims in mathematics can 
be replaced by modal claims is that a commitment to objective modal claims concerning 
consistency and logical consequence is itself a commitment to mathematical objects —par-
ticularly, to sets— given that to claim that a theory is logically consistent (for example) just 
is to claim that it has a model. Indeed, as José Miguel Sagüillo points out, in his 1971 book, 
Philosophy of Logic, Putnam argues explicitly for an account of logical validity in terms of 
sets. If we wish to maintain the view that the modal structural interpretation of mathemat-
ics avoids commitment to mathematical objects, then it looks as though we must reject the 
reduction of modal claims to claims about the existence of set theoretic models, and instead 
accept primitive modality.
Otávio Bueno, in his contribution, is unsatisfied with the proposal to accept modal 
facts as primitive, given that it provides no answer to the question of “what grounds the 
possibility of structures satisfying the axioms of ZFC” (Bueno, p. 210). Perhaps, Bueno sug-
gests, Putnam’s insight that the use of mathematics in science requires only its objectivity 
and not the existence of mathematical objects can be secured in another way. Rather than 
offering modal structural translations of mathematics, Bueno proposes to leave mathemat-
ics as it is, and accept the indispensable quantification over mathematical objects in empiri-
cal science. Nevertheless, Bueno claims, such acceptance does not force a commitment to 
an ontology of abstract mathematical objects, given the possibility of recognising an onto-
logically neutral reading of our quantifiers. On Bueno’s proposal, mere quantification over 
a domain of objects does not require acceptance of the existence of the objects quantified 
over. Rather, existence can be indicated in other ways (e.g. via the ascription of an existence 
predicate).
If quantifier commitment involves no ontological commitment, then we are owed an 
account of when a theory is committed to the real existence of an object it quantifies over. 
One option would be to offer a causal criteria: we are committed to the existence of objects 
our theory posits as causes. Sorin Bangu offers reasons for thinking that a focus on causal 
role as making the difference between theoretical posits whose existence we should take as 
confirmed by their indispensable presence in our scientific theories and those whose exist-
ence is not confirmed would be in conflict with a form of methodological naturalism that 
many scientific realists would wish to accept. If, for example, mathematical posits play an 
indispensable explanatory role in our scientific theories, then perhaps this suffices to con-
firm the existence of the mathematical objects posited even if mathematical objects play no 
causal role (though see Susan Vineberg’s contribution for some reasons to be suspicious of 
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the claim that the use of mathematics in explanation confirms the existence of mathemati-
cal objects).
An alternative route to distinguishing between those objects we quantify over in em-
pirical science whose existence is confirmed by their role in our scientific theories, and 
those that are merely instrumental posits, is to argue that mathematical objects differ from, 
say, the physical objects quantified over in our theories in virtue of what Matteo Plebani 
calls their ‘preconceived’ nature, that being the fact that their properties appear to be fixed 
by the way we characterize them in a way that is not true of the physical objects to which 
we take our theories to be genuinely ontologically committed. If mathematical posits are 
distinguished from physical posits by virtue of being preconceived, then this would provide 
support for the idea that the question of “how the concrete world is and whether there 
are abstract objects are orthogonal” (Plebani, p. 250). It is this intuition that seems ulti-
mately to stand behind Putnam’s own skepticism about the ontological implications of his 
indispensability argument when he asks, “if any entities do not interact with us or with the 
empirical world at all, then doesn’t it follow that everything would be the same if they didn’t 
exist?” (Putnam 2000, 33) So perhaps a defence of mathematical objects as preconceived 
would provide the key to seeing the indispensability considerations as supporting the ob-
jectivity of mathematics but not the existence of mathematical objects.
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